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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the People’s 
Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization efforts and how 
banking reforms are instrumental to that effort.  China must 
modernize its weaponry in order for the PLA to be a credible 
military force and enable China to continue its rise as a 
regional and global power.  Bank reforms are one methodology 
for continued PLA modernization because the PLA desperately 
needs significant and sustained defense budget expenditures 
in order to bring the PLA into the 21st century.  PLA 
modernization expenditures will have to compete with other 
societal reform programs for the windfall from an expanding 
economy.  As China becomes older, wealthier, and more 
urbanized, Chinese Communist Party leaders will come under 
increasing pressure to provide more social services to its 
citizens.  Defense expenditures and PLA modernization 
efforts will have to compete with additional government 
spending on pensions, health care, public infrastructure and 
the environment.  Continued banking reform is an essential 
component to grow the Chinese economy and secure the 
significant and sustained defense spending that is critical 
to the PLA modernization effort.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the People’s 
Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization efforts and how 
banking reforms are instrumental to that effort.  Bank 
reforms are one methodology for continued PLA modernization 
because the PLA desperately needs significant and sustained 
defense budget expenditures in order to bring the PLA into 
the 21st century.  As China continues to integrate into the 
global economy, Beijing’s leaders are facing increasing 
domestic pressures to deal with all the externalities of 
uneven economic growth such as rising unemployment, urban-
rural inequality, and income inequality.  Important social 
programs such as better education, improved health care, a 
robust social safety net, environmental protection will all 
compete with PLA modernization efforts for valuable central 
funding.  This thesis will show how banking reform is an 
essential element to secure funding for continued PLA 
modernization. 
The PLA plays a critical role in shaping Chinese 
national strategic objectives, foreign policy, and defense 
policy as well as providing the strategic research, 
analysis, and intelligence that serve as the principal 
source for civilian leadership in determining China’s 
security situation.1   
                     
 1 James Mulvenon “China:  Conditional Compliance.” Coercion and Governance:  
The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Multiah Alagappa.  
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford Univ. Press, 2001), 325. 
 2
Recent statements by senior Chinese leaders along with 
increased defense expenditures, are gaining worldwide 
attention.  The head of the PLA’s General Logistics 
Department, Liao Xilong, noted, “The present-day is none too 
peaceful . . .to protect national security and territorial 
integrity, we must adequately increase spending on military 
modernization.”2 
This statement accompanied official Chinese reports 
that 2007 defense expenditures would increase by nearly 18 
percent. General Xilong went on to say the extra money would 
go toward improving China’s ability to wage high-tech 
warfare, to defend its information systems against jamming, 
and to improve joint operations between its ground, air and 
sea forces.3   
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made similar comments when 
he delivered his annual government report to the National 
People’s Congress, asserting the PLA must modernize in order 
to “effectively carry out the historic mission of the army 
in the new stage of the new century” (emphasis added) and 
that China would “intensify defense-related research and 
efforts to produce advanced weaponry and equipment.”4  The 
“advanced weaponry” for the “new stage” refers to the 
widespread adoption of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) concept that fundamentally changes the nature of 
warfare through the innovative application of high-
technology.  There are many different components for an RMA, 
 
                     
2 Edward Cody, “China Boosts Military Spending” The Washington Post, Monday, 
Mar 5, 2007, http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed Aug 29, 2007). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.  
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but a significant and sustained defense budget is crucial in 
order to fund the exorbitant costs of high-technology 
weapons systems. 
During the past several years, Chinese defense 
expenditures have steadily increased, primarily as a result 
of the remarkable expansion of China’s economy.  Economic 
growth has increased the capacity of the Chinese government 
to mobilize sufficient revenues to underwrite a strategic 
campaign of defense modernization.5  From the Chinese 
perspective the two national objectives are complementary in 
that a robust economy will translate into a robust military. 
Later sections of the thesis will establish why banking 
reform is essential to grow the overall economy.  Continued 
PLA modernization depends upon “growing the economic pie” 
versus allocating a larger share to defense and 
modernization efforts.  One method of increasing revenue is 
to raise the tax rate.  However, the evidence suggests 
Beijing’s abilities in tax administration and revenue 
collection isn’t as efficient as it needs to be to secure 
the significant amount of funds immediately needed for PLA 
modernization and current social programs.6   
Another strategy to grow the economy is to engage in 
significant deficit spending.  For China, this has the 
potential benefit of alleviating some of the social 
pressures if Beijing funds employment relief, education, 
basic research, and public health programs.  However, 
deficit spending is a risky proposal for Beijing since it is 
                     
5 Robert Sutter, “Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the 
United States” (Lanham:  Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 4.  
6 Asia:  “Return to Sender; China’s Tax System 2007.” The Economist, Apr 14, 
2007.  http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed Sep 12, 2007). 
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still coping with crippling debts from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and a surplus of fixed capital 
investments.  Additionally, the Chinese are prodigious 
savers with a national savings rate of nearly 50 percent of 
GDP.  Unfortunately, China’s inefficient financial sector 
provides little diversity for capital investments, while 
state-owned lenders freely allocated capital to “no-hope 
state enterprises in order to keep them from firing 
everyone, so this so-called “investment” was really just 
welfare.”7 
The aforementioned factors support a program of 
increasing domestic consumption versus increasing government 
spending to boost the economy.  Therefore, banking reform is 
an essential methodology to grow the economic pie.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
The question of whether banking reform will impact the 
capacity of the Chinese government to further modernize the 
PLA is of interest not only to the United States, but also 
to China’s regional competitors throughout Asia and the 
Pacific.  If successfully reformed, the Chinese banking 
sector requires the significant commitment of public 
resources to cover existing non-serviceable debt. 
However, the government has consistently devoted more 
funds to weapon acquisitions.  From 1990 to 2003, the 
official defense budget allocation for military equipment 
jumped from RMB 5 billion to RMB 64.8 billion.  These 
increases are about twice the rate of growth of the official 
                     
7 Sebastian Mallaby, “In Beijing, A Growing Problem” The Washington Post, 
Jul 11, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed Sep 12, 2007). 
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defense budget.8  Also the portion of the budget earmarked 
for equipment increased from 16.3 to 34 percent in the same 
time period.  Finally, from 1997-2003 official Chinese 
budget figures show the amount of funding for equipment grew 
153 percent, more than for the other two categories of 
personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M).9 
This increased defense spending shows a national 
commitment to absorb the potential negative political 
consequences of increased defense spending when there are so 
many other compelling programs competing for scarce dollars.  
The externalities of rapid economic expansion (rising 
unemployment from closing of state-owned enterprises, urban-
rural inequalities, environmental degradation, expanding 
middle-class, pay and income disparities) are all front-
stage and center in China and creating tremendous pressure 
on the Communist leadership.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. PLA Modernization 
The literature on China’s military modernization 
program is contentious.  While no one disputes that China is 
modernizing and significantly increasing defense 
expenditures, experts vocally disagree on the strategic and 
political intent behind the modernization.  There are two 
ongoing debates concerning the rise of China as a regional 
military power.  The first argument is whether or not 
China’s military modernization poses a threat to the United 
                     
8 Evan Medeiros, Roger Cliff, et al. A New Direction for China’s Defense 
Industry, (Santa Monica, CA:  Rand Corporation, 2005) xvii. 
9 Ibid, xvii. 
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States.10  The Taiwan straits issue is the most likely 
scenario to precipitate a China-U.S. military confrontation.  
A significant part of this debate concerns China’s true 
military combat capability, and whether or not China is 
catching up with the technologically and operationally 
superior U.S. forces.  For potential regional conflicts, 
competing claims over the Spratly Islands is considered the 
most likely scenario to embroil China into hostilities with 
its regional neighbors. 
There is no consensus on China’s strategic intent 
behind its defense development and modernization program.  
Some experts argue that China can in fact modernize its 
military in order to secure its national interests.11  
Others assert it is not possible to accurately predict 
military capabilities more than 10 to 15 years in advance 
and regardless of China’s modernization efforts, China’s 
regional importance should not be underestimated.12  
However, there is a growing number of experts that argue 
despite China’s increased defense expenditures, PLA combat 
 
                     
10 Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up, China’s Rise 
and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no 4 
(2001): 5-40;  Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” 
Commentary Nov. 2000, 17-26; Jane’s Intelligent Review, “Pentagon Raises Eyebrow 
at China’s Military Rise,” 18, no 8 (2006); 50-51; Bates Gill and Michael 
O’Hanlon, “China’s Hollow Military,” The National Interest no. 53 (1999):  John 
Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 58, no.3 (2004): 353-367; Evan Medeiros and M. Tayler 
Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Nov – Dec 2003, 22-35.  
 11 Jonathan Pollack, “China as a Military Power,” Military Power and Policy 
in Asian States:  China, India, Japan, ed., Onkar Marwah and Jonathan Pollack 
(Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1980), 43-100. 
 12 Michael Pillsbury, “PLA Capabilities in the 21st Century:  How Does China 
Assess Its Future Security Needs?” The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, 
ed., Larry Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 1999), 89-158. 
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capability remains inferior to U.S. combat capability and 
will remain so, especially with their domestic defense-
industrial complex.13 
China has licensed production of Soviet/Russian 
armaments and experts unanimously agree that China’s 
domestic weapons production capability are upgraded copies 
of 1950’s and 1960’s Soviet equipment.14  Furthermore, while 
many new types of advanced weapons have entered service 
since the start of economic reforms and rising GDP growth in 
the late 1970’s, those weapons systems are now hopelessly 
obsolete.  Domestically produced weapons entering service 
since the 1980’s are “incremental improvements on earlier 
designs” which in many cases, “can trace their lineage back 
to 1950s’ Soviet technology.”15   
Typical of most Chinese SOEs, the Chinese defense-
industrial complex (CDIC) suffers from extreme 
overemployment and overcapacity.  The CDIC has three times 
as many employee as are needed.  To put this into 




                     
 13 Bernard Cole and Paul Godwin, “Advancing Military Technology and the PLA:  
Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century,” The Chinese Armed Forces in 
the 21st Century, ed., Larry Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, PA:  Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999), 194. 
 14 Paul Godwin, “The PLA faces the 21st Century:  Reflections on Technology, 
Doctrine, Strategy and Operations,” China’s Military Faces the Future, ed., 
James Lilley and David Shambaugh (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999): 63: John 
Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Search for a Modern Air Force,” International 
Security 24, no.1 (1999): 64-94; Onkar Marwah and Jonathan Pollak, eds. Military 
Power and Policy in Asian States:  China, India, Japan. (Boulder, CO:  Westview 
Press, 1980). 
 15 E. Medeiros, “A New Direction,” 130. 
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workers, yet typically produces more aircraft per year than 
China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corporation produces in 10 years 
with 30,000 workers.16 
Later sections will outline Beijing’s three broad 
options to quickly modernize its forces; create an advanced 
domestic weapons design and production capability by 
upgrading its CDIC, pursue joint ventures with foreign 
partners, or purchase advanced weapons from foreign 
militaries.  All three options involve significant and 
sustained defense budget appropriations spanning decades. 
2. Financial System Reform 
There is a consensus among economists and financial 
analysts that China’s unprecedented economic growth is 
simply the convergence of resources, primarily an enormous 
labor pool coupled with foreign investment.  These financial 
experts cite traditional macroeconomic analysis to show how 
Beijing’s economic reforms enabled China to tap its 
resources and decentralize, modernize, and liberalize its 
economic policies to sustain unprecedented gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth over the last 25 years.17 
Beijing is pursuing a wide range of strategies to try 
and maintain and sustain their economic upswing.  As China 
becomes more ingrained into the international financial 
                     
 16 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military:  Progress, Problems, and 
Prospects (Berkeley CA: University of CA Press), 2002. 
17 See for example, Lardy, Nicholas R. Integrating China into the Global 
Economy. Vol. 1. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002; Adams, F. 
Gerard, Byron Gangnes, and Yochanan Shachmurove. "Why is China so Competitive? 
Measuring and Explaining China's Competitiveness." The World Economy 29, no. 2 
(2006): 95-122; Jae Ho Chung. "China's Reforms at Twenty-Five: Challenges for 
the New Leadership." China: An International Journal 1, no. 1 (Mar 2003): 119-
132. 
 9
community it is essential that Beijing’s short and mid-term 
macroeconomic policies and reform measures continue to 
ensure China remains competitive in the global economy.  
Most experts are cautiously optimistic arguing that moderate 
economic growth is sustainable provided Beijing continues to 
reform and embrace free-market competition.  Experts argue 
for a variety of micro and macro economic tools to manage 
this growth including inflation targeting, and currency 
devaluation.  However, the two most critical reform measures 
to ensure China remains competitive in the global economy is 
banking reform and the continued shedding of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).18  The decentralized Chinese banking 
system is fueling uneven growth among the 31 regions, and 
countering Beijing’s monetary policies to control hyper-
growth.  Similarly, Beijing’s attempts to sustain economic 
growth are countered by the underperforming and inefficient 
SOEs which still account for 30-40% of the Chinese 
economy.19  Recent statements by senior officials suggest 
Beijing is aware of these daunting challenges and are 
focused on continued reform. 
The current stages of banking reform are in many ways 
more difficult and complex than earlier financial system 
reforms.  The problem of non-performing loans in the 1990s 
was a direct result of the success of other economic 
reforms, namely the dismantling (through sales, closing, or 
divestiture) of the state-owned enterprises.  Preferential 
access to bank credit was the major policy instrument for 
                     
18 Roach, Stephen. "Soft Landing made in China." Morgan Stanley, Aug 22, 
2006, http://www.morganstanley.com/(Accessed Jul 17, 2007). 
19 Roach, Stephen. "Inside the China Debate." Morgan Stanley, Mar 22, 2006, 
http://www.morganstanley.com/ (Accessed Jul 17, 2007). 
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Beijing to manage the immediate unemployment pressures from 
closing SOEs.20  Current reforms must be closely coordinated 
with further reforms of SOEs, the financial system, and the 
tax administration.  This delicate coordination is 
politically volatile since the required closing of insolvent 
enterprises and the reorganization and recapitalization of 
the financial system is contributing to unemployment rates 
“far higher than China has experienced since the economic 
depression of the 1960’s” as a result of the disastrous 
Great Leap Forward.21 
Also, Beijing’s leaders and the ruling Communist party 
are voluntarily surrendering a great deal of political and 
economic power with the on-going financial system reforms.  
By eventually allowing the emergence of private banks 
through the sale of ownership shares to individual investors 
or by the licensing of new private institutions and 
expanding the role of foreign financial institutions, market 
forces will have a greater input in focusing capital 
resources.22  Nicholas Lardy elegantly captures the dilemma 
for Beijing’s leaders; “Since the financial system in 
particular is the last remaining powerful instrument through 
which the state and party directly influence resource 
allocation, they are naturally reluctant to give up this 
power.”23 
                     
 20 Mallaby, 1. 
21 Nicholas Lardy, China’s Unfinished Revolution, Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998, 220. 
22 John Langlois, Jr., “The WTO and China’s Financial System” The China 
Quarterly No. 167, (Sep 2001) 610-629. 
23 Lardy, China’s Unfinished Revolution, 221. 
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D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will explore China’s banking reform 
strategies and its effects on modernization efforts of the 
PLA.  To accomplish this, financial tables and figures will 
graphically capture and supplement the arguments.  Despite 
significant progress in improving the transparency of state 
decision-making, China remains a closed communist country 
with tight controls over the media.  Beijing’s “official” 
position on the amount of defense spending, or on the 
overall success of financial system reforms must often be 
externally validated.   
Official U.S. organizations, foreign governments, and 
independent consulting and analysis groups unanimously agree 
that official defense expenditure reporting and statistics 
are not all-inclusive.  Two Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) reports cover defense components in China comparably 
to the U.S. defense budget, and conclude that China’s 
military expenditures run approximately two times their 
published claims during various years analyzed in the reform 
period.24  A Taiwanese White Paper on Chinese defense 
spending concluded China’s actual defense spending was three 
times the official report.25  Yet another report from the 
U.S. Arms Control and Dearmament Agency (ACDA) used 
purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates and concluded the 
actual Chinese budget was 12 times greater than the official 
figure.26 
                     
24 Solomon Karmel, China and the People’s Liberation Army:  Great Power or 




Part of the reason is because of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s tight hold on information and its tendency to “spin” 
information in the best positive light.  Two significant 
current events may be fueling this tendency.  The first is 
the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
which is expected to convene in October, 2007.  Party 
Congresses only meet every five years and “is the most 
authoritative body in the CCP’s organizational hierarchy.”27  
The agenda for the week long delegation will most assuredly 
discuss the nation’s economy and the state of reforms.  The 
other event is Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics 
which provides China with an international stage to 
highlight its economic rise and emerging regional and global 
power. 
Given the opaqueness of official Chinese statistics, I 
will rely heavily upon external financial estimates from 
investment firms and independent economists and analysts.  
The main sources for this analysis will include current 
business and scholarly books, journals, magazine articles, 
and on-line databases from established organizations such as 
the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the 
World Bank. 
 
                     
27 Lyman Miller, “The Road to the 17th Party Congress” China Leadership 
Monitor no. 18 (Spring 2006).  Journal on-line.  http://www.hoover.org/ 
(Accessed Sep 2, 2007). 
 13
II. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY HISTORIC OVERVIEW 
A brief synopsis of PLA doctrine is essential to 
understand the current modernization efforts.  In this 
chapter, I provide the background on the evolution of the 
PLA from the Red Army and establish how military readiness 
and combat capability is directly a function of the security 
environment and the threats within that environment.  This 
section broadly defines the threats, and therefore 
modernization and readiness efforts of the PLA under the 
leadership of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and the post-Deng 
leadership. 
A. PLA UNDER MAO ZEDONG – “PEOPLE’S WAR” AS A BASELINE 
Under Mao Zedong, the PLA’s operative military 
strategy, primarily at the campaign level of warfare, has 
been known as “active defense.”28  This term has its origins 
in the Chinese revolutionary war, when Mao pursued a 
military strategy of “offensive defense or defense through 
decisive engagements,” in which PLA units (then the Red 
Army) would proactively engage and close with the enemy, 
exploit its weak points and attempt to destroy the enemy’s 
capability and will.29  “Active defense,” as elaborated by 
Mao, takes place within a broader context of “people’s war.”  
The Maoist theory of people’s war is often regarded as 
passive warfare of necessity – “to lure the enemy in deep” 
 
                     
 28 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military:  Progress, Problems and 
Prospects, (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 2002), 58. 
 29 Ibid. 
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in order to overcome the enemy’s technological superiority 
by playing to the strengths of geography and the civilian 
population.30  
As with many translated Chinese terms and aphorisms, 
“people’s war” has multiple meanings and connotations.  This 
thesis will concentrate on the purely military, doctrinal 
component of people’s war as an irregular type of warfare 
based on mobility, attrition, and other small-unit, guerilla 
type tactics.31  With this particular type of warfare, land 
was traded for time as the Red Army strategically withdrew 
from massed forces.  Red Army units would then harass better 
equipped Kuomintang forces with guerrilla style hit-and-run 
tactics.  The ideological basis for the Maoist “People’s 
War” concept is suited to mobilizing the populace to fight a 
national struggle for liberation.  In the context of 
revolutionary discontent, the People’s War ideology stressed 
that political resolve, correct political doctrine, and 
unswerving loyalty to command would inevitably triumph over 
capitalist, imperialist forces.32   
However this ideology is woefully inadequate outside a 
revolutionary struggle and the newly emerged People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) faced a dynamic security 
environment.  China shares more borders than any other 
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 31 The political definition describes the revolutionary nature of the PLA 
and the unique relationship between the military and the CCP leaders.  The 
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country in the world;33 has overlapping sea claims with some 
of those same states and six other maritime nations;34 and 
had territorial sovereignty issues with three entities that 
it didn’t yet control (Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau).35 
 In rapid succession, two global events pressed the need 
for military modernization and abandonment of the Maoist 
“People’s War” concept.  The first was the Soviet Union’s 
successful detonation of its first nuclear device in 1949, 
the same year the Chinese civil war ended.  The second was 
the Korean war which erupted on June 1950. 
The Korean War challenged [Maoist] dogma.  It 
brought Chinese troops face-to-face with the 
devastating lethality of modern air and naval 
power.  The threats by the United States to use 
nuclear weapons in Korea and against China itself 
during the war and subsequent crises activated 
Mao’s ambition to make China forever immune to 
such intimidation.  Despite the apparent 
perpetuation of People’s War as scripture, 
Beijing secretly started Projects 02 (nuclear 
weapons), 05 (ballistic missiles), and 09 
[focused on nuclear-powered submarines and its 
missiles].36 
 By scanning its security environment, China recognized 
its overwhelming military weakness and concluded that any 
future war would be an all-out confrontation against a 
                     
 33 China borders 14 states:  Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, India, Kazakhstan, 
North Korea, Kygyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
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 35 Andrew Nathan, Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress:  
China’s Search for Security, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998), 43. 
 36 John Lewis, Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower:  The Politics of Force 
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“superior occupation force” and should prepare for “limited, 
high-tech wars and regional struggles.”37  The PLA had to 
modernize its military equipment in order to address this 
security challenge. 
B. DENG XIAOPING’S ECONOMIC PRIORITIES 
Along with his many other significant reforms, Deng 
Xiaoping espoused China’s desire to expand “its 
comprehensive national power.”  Deng popularized this phrase 
in the early 1980’s and while its exact meaning is often 
debated, the essential element is to denote a more expansive 
definition of national power than simply military might.38  
Chinese analysts regard Deng’s broadened definition as an 
implicit critique of the “economically unsustainable pursuit 
of pure military might” by the former Soviet Union, and Deng 
wanted to ensure that China doesn’t repeat this mistake.39  
Instead, a “technologically innovative economy” forms the 
foundation for comprehensive national power, coupled with 
the country’s “political and military systems, science and 
technology, diplomacy, and other less tangible factors.40 
Figure 2.1 shows the steady decline of military 
expenditures through the Deng Xiaoping years as domestic 
economic priorities became paramount.  The PLA’s combat 
capability was deliberately allowed to languish as Beijing’s 
leaders single-mindedly focused on building economic 
                     
 37 Karmel, 30-31. 
 38 James Mulvenon, Murray Tanner, et al Chinese Responses to U.S. Military 
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 39 Ibid. 
 40 Ibid. 
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capacity during the early years of the reform period.  A 
book published by the Contemporary China Publishing House, 
The Chinese PLA exactly captures the philosophical intent 
behind Beijing’s neglect of the PLA: 
International power is not achieved primarily 
through nuclear capability, army size, alliances 
or diplomacy.  Instead, its primary source is a 
nation’s economic base.  By equating economic 
development with power development and stridently 
advocating economic construction, Deng Xiaoping’s 
contribution to Chinese strategic thinking on 
“military sciences” would long endure.41 
Figure 2.1  Chinese Budget Categories, 1978-200342 
 
 
In this context, government procurement of military 
goods declined dramatically following the adoption of Deng’s 
                     
 41 Karmel, 128. 
42 Mulvenon, Tanner, et al. Chinese Responses, 21. 
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“Four Modernizations” policy, which placed the military as 
the last priority.43 
1. Deng’s PLA Modernization Plan 
Military expenditures as a percentage of central 
government spending dropped significantly, from a wartime 
high of more than 40 percent in 1950 immediately following 
the civil war to approximately 8 percent in 2002.44  When 
Deng Xiaoping emerged as the Secretary General of the 
Communist Party of China in 1978, his far-ranging reforms 
would profoundly affect the readiness and combat capability 
of the PLA.  Even if one only examines spending since the 
onset of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the later 
1970’s, military expenditures as a percentage of government 
expenditures have fallen almost by half, from 15 percent to 
8 percent.45  Figure 2.2 shows the overall downward trend in 







                     
 43 The Four Modernizations were in the fields of Agriculture, Industry, 
Science/Technology, and National Defense.  See also John Frankenstein, “China’s 
Defense Industries:  A New Course?” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, 
eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica, CA:  
RAND Corporation), CF-145-CAPP/AF, 1999. 
 44 Crane, Modernizing, 109. 
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Figure 2.2 Percent of National Budget Spent on Defense, 
Official Figures 1950-1995 
 
 
Defense spending after 1960 significantly increased as 
a result of Mao Zedong’s Third Front campaign,46 and another 
sharp spike occurred in 1969 as the PLA was used to suppress 
the Red Guard factions from the Cultural Revolution.47  
Except for those two events, defense expenditures 
continually declined. 
In 1981, Deng addressed the PLA and called on the 
Chinese military to build a powerful, modern and 
professionalized revolutionary armed force and, “on the 
basis of our steadily expanding economy, [to] improve the 
army’s weapons and equipment and speed up the modernization 
of our national defense.”48  Significantly, Deng used the 
                     
 46 The Third Front was Mao’s plan to “create a huge self-sufficient 
industrial base in the Chinese interior to serve as a strategic reserve in the 
event of China being drawn into war.  This program was immensely costly, having 
a negative impact on China’s economic development that was certainly more far-
reaching than the disruption of the Cultural Revolution.”   See Barry Naughton, 
“The Third Front:  Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior.” The China 
Quarterly, no. 115 (Sep 1991):  351-386. 
 47 Karmel, 126. 
 48 Joseph Gallagher, “China’s Military Industrial Complex:  Its Approach to 
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1987):  991. 
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term modernization to specifically refer to the upgrading of 
weapons and equipment.  This narrow Chinese usage of the 
term military modernization does not encompass other 
improvements such as development of military tactics, 
techniques and procedures and regularization of the 
military.  Those elements are essential to the overall 
readiness of a military but remain beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 Deng Xiaoping expressed the national policy when he 
said defense modernization “can be achieved only when it is 
based on the development of the country’s industry and 
agriculture as a whole.”  To PLA Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi, 
this meant that the PLA “should rely on the development of 
[the] national economy and science and technology to change 
the backwardness of our weaponry.”49  The new attention to 
advanced weaponry was essential since the PLA strategists 
revised their threat assessment in the 1970’s and 1980’s and 
concentrated on frontier defense.  By this time, Beijing’s 
relations with the Soviet Union had frosted over 
considerably and defending the 4,000 mile border between the 
two countries became a primary concern.  One of Deng’s more 
important doctrinal revisions was increased emphasis on 
weaponry and technology instead of the ideological and human 
factor in war.   These redefinitions called for a new 
aphorism, and the guiding phrase “people’s war under modern 
conditions” was born.50 
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C. PLA UNDER DENG XIAOPING – “PEOPLE’S WAR UNDER MODERN 
CONDITIONS” 
People’s War Under Modern Conditions required a 
wholesale upgrade of arms and equipment since the closest 
threat (Soviet Union) possessed superior mobility, 
firepower, and tactics.  Even senior PLA officials conceded 
they would be hard pressed to defend the Chinese mainland 
from modern warfare with the Soviets based on maneuver and 
joint operations, and the previous doctrine of “luring the 
enemy in deep” would be disastrous.51  Instead, the new 
strategy sought to blunt the technological advantages of the 
Soviet Union by integrating armor, artillery, and air 
defense allowing PLA forces to “win the first battle.”  
Additionally, for the first time since the Chinese nuclear 
program was inaugurated in the late 1950’s, nuclear forces 
were included in operational military strategy to defend the 
Chinese mainland.52 
These operational adjustments required significant and 
sustained defense expenditures and the closer integration of 
China’s defense-industrial complex.  With the backing of 
China’s economic development and scientific and 
technological achievements, the PLA sought to accelerate its 
weaponry and equipment modernization drive mainly by relying 
on its own efforts.  However, self-reliance on weapons 
modernization isn’t the most effective strategy for rapid 
modernization and embracing a true RMA.  Ever since the 
1980’s, Western experts unanimously agree that China’s 
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organic defense-industrial complex, military research and 
development and production capabilities are beset with 
weaknesses and limitations.53  Given Deng Xiaoping’s 
explicit priority of economic development, where would the 
PLA and the defense industry get the desperately needed 
funds to modernize its defense forces? 
D. EXTRABUDGETARY FUNDING 
From the late 1970’s, when Deng Xiaoping initiated far-
reaching reforms of China’s planned economy, until recently, 
China’s defense-industrial complex (CDIC) led a troubled 
existence.  Government procurement of military goods 
declined dramatically following the adoption of Deng’s “Four 
Modernizations” policy, which placed the military as the 
last priority.54  As a result, most defense enterprises were 
officially encouraged to diversify into production of non-
military/civilian goods or engage in arms sales to replace 
dwindling government purchases of military equipment.  Many 
firms soon became dependent on these alternate sources of 
income for their very survival.55 
The fact the PLA engaged in commercial economic 
activities by itself isn’t particularly noteworthy.  Many 
professional militaries were either forced by circumstances 
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or opportunity to loot or “requisition” economic production 
for their very survival.56  What makes the Chinese case 
unique is the sheer size and scope of the PLA’s extra-
budgetary activities.  In the 1980’s, official Chinese 
publications placed the number of PLA enterprises at 10,000 
while non-Chinese estimates varied from 30,000 to as many as 
50,000.57  At the height of the PLA’s economic activities, 
“PLA, Inc.,” as it is colloquially known controlled a multi-
billion dollar international business empire that included 
large farms to world-class hotels and transnational 
corporations.58  Table 2.1 shows the amount of funds 
generated by PLA, Inc. 
Table 2.1 PLA business production output value and 
profits, 1978-199659 
Year Production output 
value (Rmb billion) 
(annual % increase 
in parens.) 
Pre-tax profits/after-
tax profits  (Rmb 
billion)       (annual 
% increase in parens.) 
Pre-tax rate of return 
(Rmb billion) 
(after-tax rate of 
return in parens.) 
1978 1.50 0.35/0.28 23.30% (18.6%) 
1985 5.60 0.80/0.64 (31.6%) 14.29% (11.43%) 
1986 7.00 (20%) 1.17/0.96 (31.6%) 16.71% (13.71%) 
1987 10.35 (32.4%) 2.40/1.99 (51.25%) 23.20% (19.3%) 
1988 14.00 (26%) 2.70/2.15 (11.1%) 20.70% (15.36%) 
1989 20.00 (30%) 3.80/3.00 (29%) 17.50% (15%) 
1990 22.50 (11.1%) 4.00/3.20 (5%) 17.80% (14.2%) 
1991 24.30 (7.4%) 4.20/3.36 (4.7%) 17.30% (13.83%) 
1992 28.00 (13.2%) 5.00/4.00 (16%) 17.90% (14.29%) 
1993 33.50 (16.4%) 6.00/4.80 (16.7%) 17.90% (14.33%) 
1994 33.50 (0%) 6.00/4.80 (0%) 17.90% (14.33%) 
1995 38.00 (11.4%) 6.50/5.30 (8.2%) 17.10% (13.95%) 
1996 40.00 (5%) 6.50/5.30 (0%) 16.25% (13.25%) 
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These remarkable growth rates, especially the nearly 
20% average increase from 1986 through 1993 surpassed the 
forecasts of military authorities who only expected modest 
5% growth when they approved the extra-budgetary commercial 
ventures.60 
1. 1998 Divestiture Act 
On 22 July 1998, at an expanded session of the Central 
Military Commission, CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin gave a speech 
in which he publicly called for the dissolution of the 
military-business complex, asserting: 
To make concerted efforts to properly develop the 
army in an all-around manner, the central 
authorities decided:  The army and the armed 
police should earnestly screen and rectify 
various commercial companies operated by their 
subordinate unites, and shall not carry out any 
commercial activities in the future . . .Military 
and armed police units should resolutely 
implement the central authorities’ resolution and 
fulfill as soon as possible the requirements that 
their subordinate units shall not carry out any 
commercial activities in the future.61 
This bold decision significantly challenged the 
powerful PLA generals by directly affecting their military 
budgets, and often, their personal pocketbooks.  Because 
these enterprises were run at all levels of the military, 
there was a significant lack of oversight on the collection 
and accounting of profits and corruption was rampant.  One 
widespread scandal in the northeastern Liaoning Province 
involved US$500,000 and 300 military personnel from 43 
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different army units.62  Even high-ranking PLA officers were 
directly involved, and in 1992, Major General Liang Gingzhi, 
head of one of the General Political Department’s commercial 
departments was arrested for his involvement in illegal 
profit skimming.63 
While the PLA’s divestiture of its commercial 
enterprises has proceeded remarkably well since the 1998 
order, it has certainly not been complete.  It is estimated 
that as many as 20 percent of the units involved in 
extracurricular commerce have continued with their business 
activities—which would yield approximately $2 billion per 
year in revenue.64 
In March 1999, Minister of Finance Xiang Huaicheng 
announced the military budget for the new fiscal year in his 
annual work report: 
In line with the CPE Central Committee request, 
central finances will provide appropriate 
subsidies to the army, armed police force, and 
political and law organs after their severance of 
ties with enterprises.  In this connection, 
104.65 billion renminbi, up 12.7 percent from the 
previous year because of the provision of 
subsidies to the army and of regular increases.65 
Despite the significant loss of operating funds, there 
is substantial evidence that the divestiture, in principle, 
was supported by a corruption-weary military leadership.  
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One particularly egregious case of corruption involved six 
PLA and People’s Armed Police companies that was allegedly 
bankrupting the country’s two geographical oil monopolies.66  
Another case of rampant smuggling by the military during the 
Asian financial crisis allegedly deprived the central 
government of hundreds of billions of renminbi in customs 
revenue which contributed to worsening deflation.67  In 
addition to actual illegal activity, questionable diversion 
of valuable military resources for commercial purposes was 
widespread.  A Jinan military Region investigation found 
that a tank regiment had diverted 53 percent of its training 
fuel, and an artillery regiment 70 percent of its allocated 
fuel to commercial activities.68 
 At the height of “PLA, Inc.” in the mid 1990s, one 
Chinese source placed the total PLA assets at 180 billion 
RMB (US$20.2 billion).69 Foreign estimates of annual profits 
range from $1 to $3 billion, although the General Logistics 
Department claimed in 1998 that the actual figure was on the 
order of $600 to $700 million.70 
E. RMA WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 
[China] must actively seek to promote the 
revolution in military affairs with Chinese 
Characteristics and make efforts to achieve 
                     
66 Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune, 177. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 202. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid, 200. 
 27
development by leaps and bounds in national 
defense and armed forces mobilization.71 
PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, March 16, 2004 
In the past decade, top Chinese military and civilian 
officials have affirmed the importance of a “revolution in 
military affairs” to China’s modernization with consistent 
imprecision.72  In December 2004, for example, the State 
Council Information Office of the PRC published its third 
white paper on national defense.  An effort to describe 
China’s national defense policies and the army’s 
modernization process, “China’s National Defense in 2004” is 
also an attempt to frame China’s military modernization in 
the context of global trends in military transformation.  In 
the first chapter, the document declares that the “Worldwide 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is gaining momentum,” 
yet the paper never defines the phrase, nor does it explain 
more fully which elements of Chinese military modernization 
constitute a revolution.73 
Defining an RMA is critical because it bounds the 
discussion of what constitutes normal reconstitution of 
forces and equipment, versus evolutionary advances in 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and truly “leap-
frogging” TTPs that redefine the scope and nature of 
warfare.  An example of the evolutionary model of 
modernization is Deng Xiaoping’s PLA modernization efforts 
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of the mid to late 1970’s.  Defense modernization during 
this period followed a two pronged approach.  
The long term strategic objective was to create a 
largely self-sufficient defense establishment 
capable of developing and sustaining modern 
forces sufficient both for defense and to grant 
China the military status of a world power.  A 
second objective was to improve the PLA’s near-
term combat effectiveness using the weapons and 
equipment in its current inventory.  These two 
processes were intimately related.  If the PLA 
was to become capable of effectively using its 
current and then more technologically 
sophisticated weapons and equipment as they were 
introduced in the future, the groundwork had to 
be laid before more advanced weaponry entered the 
inventory.  In short defense modernization was to 
be incremental and slow.74 
The “incremental and slow” characterization of PLA 
modernization was the traditional, conservative approach 
favored by Beijing.  Adjustments to operational military 
doctrine ebbed and flowed as PLA war-planners scanned their 
security environment and concluded the Soviet Union was no 
longer their greatest threat.  During the height of the Cold 
War, China’s security planners concluded that the Soviet 
Union and the United States were locked in a bi-polar, 
superpower stalemate.  Therefore, a major and potentially 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union seemed unlikely, and that 
future military conflicts were projected to more likely be 
very limited in terms of political objectives and 
geographical scope.75 
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However, the conservative “incremental and slow” 
approach to modernization proved ineffective for China’s 
security needs.  The 1991 Desert Storm/Desert Shield 
campaign provided the impetus for the wholesale adoption of 
RMA terms and theoretical framework.  Although experts have 
not completely agreed upon the exact definition of an RMA or 
when a nation’s forces have successfully undergone this 
transformation, there is enough unanimity to create a common 
theoretical framework.  Most experts agree that “significant 
and punctuated advances in technological capabilities 
initiate revolutions in military affairs.”76  However the 
technology piece is only the spark since a successful RMA 
also requires key bureaucracies to have certain 
technological adaptations to enable and guide those 
technological advances toward dramatic improvements in 
military efficiency and capability.77   
Andrew Marshall, Director of the Pentagon’s Office of 
Net Assessment is widely considered as one of the leading 
specialists on military transformation and RMA among both 
Chinese military planners and U.S. analysts.78  He argues 
that the interconnectedness of technology and bureaucratic 
innovation is critical in the commonly accepted definition 
of an RMA: 
[A] major change in the nature of warfare brought 
about by the innovative application of new 
technologies which, combined with dramatic changes 
in military doctrine and operational and 
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organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the 
character and conduct of military operations.79   
Therefore, technology is the key stimulus for an RMA.  
The clearest expression of technological breakthroughs in 
warfare was the Persian Gulf War of 1991. 
The Persian Gulf War in 1991 was exactly the type of 
war PLA theorists had been theorizing about since their 
concerted drive to modernize.80  The war was relatively 
short, highly intense, and fought for prescribed political 
objectives within a confined theater of operations.  The 
allied weapons and tactics were generations ahead of what 
China encountered during their last significant engagement 
with an enemy force (Vietnam in 1979) and hoisted a harsh 
realization on Chinese senior military leaders that the 
Chinese military wasn’t prepared to deal with the new, high 
technology era of warfare.81  The shock of the Gulf War was 
further exacerbated because ever since China’s failed 
incursion into Vietnam, China’s military initiated a 
sweeping modernization and reform program.82  The Gulf War 
prompted yet another deep re-appraisal of the state of 
Chinese military forces, the nature of contemporary warfare, 
and the most effective reforms required to ready Chinese 
forces.  The PLA strategy was revised to focus on “limited 
wars under high-technology conditions” and the modernization 
program would have to heavily rely upon technology to expand 
the Chinese military capability. 
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1. Funding the RMA with Chinese Characteristics 
The Chinese government has substantially increased its 
defense expenditures, and the 2004 National Defense White 
Paper outlines defense expenditures on equipment increasing 
an average of 18 percent per year from 2000 and 2003.83   
Both in real terms and as a share of GDP in the 1980’s, 
officially reported military spending increased at double-
digit rates between 1989 and 2002.84  Although this string 
of budget increases was broken in 2003 when overall growth 
returned to single digits as the official military budget 
rose 9.4 percent, the official budget still rose more 
rapidly than growth in overall government expenditures, 
which was kept to 7.7 percent in that year.85  Beijing 
continued the high levels of defense spending with a 17.8 
percent increase in the defense budget for 2007.86   
Other signs also show that the Chinese government has 
given defense expenditures a higher priority than in the 
past decade.  Although the number of people in uniform has 
fallen, military pay and benefits have risen sharply in 
order to enhance the quality of life for PLA soldiers.  
Since the mid 1990’s, China has increased expenditures on 
military procurement to purchase a number of advanced, more 
capable combat aircraft and naval ships, many of which have 
come from Russia and abroad.87 
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As more money is funneled toward defense spending and 
modernization, Beijing has three broad opportunities to 
channel these valuable funds into military capabilities.  
The first is to produce all the weapons needed for its 
military with its organic defense-industrial complex.  The 
second is to purchase entire weapons systems and associated 
parts and technology from external sources.  The third 
possibility combines the previous two paths by trying to 
improve organic research, development, and production 
capabilities to domestically produce better quality weapons, 
while also purchasing key weapon systems to fill capability 
gaps.88 
Modern weapons are expensive, and China is estimated to 
have spent about $20 billion on imports form Russia alone, 
with some $12 billion worth of weapons and equipment 
delivered by 200489.  High cost was the chief reason for the 
small quantities of weapons that the Chinese had bought 
until then, and it was the strongest rationale of the Deng 
Xiaoping leadership for rejecting military demands for more 
money.  Its argument was that economic development had to 
precede military advances.  By the early 1990’s, this 
argument began to weaken.  After a brief recession due to 
leadership differences that followed the suppression of the 
Tiananmen demonstrations, the Chinese economy began to rise 
rapidly. 
As a consequence of the higher priority given military 
spending by the Chinese government, the share of GDP taken 
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by the official defense budget has increased from a low of 
1.06 percent of GDP in 1996 to 1.66 percent in 2003.90  
Unofficial estimates place total expenditures within a 
higher range of 2.3 to 2.8 percent of GDP in 2003.  However, 
all three of these estimates (1.66, 2.3 and 2.8 percent of 
GDP) are not extraordinarily large as an overall percentage 
of the nation’s total economic output.  During the 1980’s 
most NATO and Warsaw Pact countries (other than the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union) spent from 2 to 3 percent of GDP on the 
military.91  Therefore, the Chinese government has 
considerable room to increase military expenditures as an 
overall share of GDP. 
That said, recent rates of increase in military 
spending are not sustainable.  Between 1988 and 2003, 
officially reported spending on defense rose 9.8 percent per 
year on average in real terms.92  If the Chinese government 
should attempt to keep defense budgets growing at 9.8 
percent per year while the economy grows at projected rates, 
military expenditures would take between 6.2 and 76 percent 
of GDP by 2025.  In other words, the share of military 
spending in GDP would rise 2.5 times over this period.93 
Since the end of the Cold War, no government has 
sustained military expenditures of 6 percent or more of GDP, 
unless it was at war or it perceived an eminent threat to 
its national security as Israel does.94 
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F. HOW TO MODERNIZE? 
1. Failure of Chinese Defense-Industrial Complex 
A clear example of the systemic weakness and limitation 
of the Chinese Defense Industry involves the J-8 
interceptor.  This single-seat, twin engine aircraft began 
development in 1964, conducted its first flight test in 1969 
and entered service in 1985.  After 20 years of development 
and full scale production, the PLA Air Force still found the 
J-8 unsatisfactory and as late as 1989, dubbed it an 
“operational test aircraft.”95  China’s domestic defense-
industrial complex is unable to domestically produce 
advanced weapons and armament and continues to receive 
technical assistance from the Russians and the West.  The J-
8-II variant of the J-8 interceptor began service in the PLA 
Navy in 1992, but this later version was still sub-standard.  
After a total of almost 30 years of development and 
operational testing, the J-8 remains “a below-par combat 
aircraft—not yet the equivalent of a 1960s-era U.S. F-4 
Phantom.96 
At roughly the same time the Chinese were operationally 
fielding the J-8 Interceptor, the United States was 
delivering the F-117 Nighthawk Stealth Fighter and the B-2 
Spirit Stealth Bomber, and just beginning the engineering 
and feasibility assessments for the F-22 Raptor.  
Operational since 1992, the F-22 represents state-of-the-art 
weapons technology and the U.S. version of adapting 
technology to the RMA.  Chinese PLA modernization and RMA 
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efforts have a long road ahead.  The inability to produce 
advanced weaponry isn’t limited to just the fighter industry 
but to most of the entire Chinese defense-industrial 
complex.  The only noticeable exception is the strategic 
nuclear weapons and missile division.97 
A 2005 Rand report paints a similarly bleak picture 
about the Chinese shipbuilding industry.  The report quotes 
a Chinese industry analyst: 
At the present time, China’s shipbuilding 
industry has the following problems:  obsolete 
production modes, yet-to-be formed effective 
technological innovation systems, lack of 
experienced scientific research personnel, and 
lack of administrative and management personnel, 
etc.98  
According to a study commissioned by the United States 
Department of Defense, there are 84 critical areas to a 
domestic advanced arms industry.  The only area where China 
has all the production capabilities is nuclear weapons and 
nuclear material processing.  In virtually “all other areas 
of critical military technologies, China is extremely 
deficient.”99 
Chinese defense-related research and development (R&D) 
also suffers from endemic weaknesses.  Two Western analysts 
estimate China’s total military research and development 
budget annually at approximately US$2 billion.100  The 
analysts concluded: 
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Given the poor state of Chinese defense R&D 
overall, this support amounts to little 
significant investment in the long-term health of 
the sector.  The increasingly cost nature of 
advanced military R&D further limits the 
potential impact of these investments . . .The 
PRC’s defense R&D base is deficient in several 
areas of technology considered to be on the 
cutting-edge of weapons development, including 
microelectronics, computers, avionics, sensors 
and seekers, electronic warfare, and advanced 
materials.  In many disciplines, Chinese 
technological development has stagnated.101 
Given the weak R&D in China’s military, there is no 
appreciable transfer of technology from civilian to military 
use.  Deng Xiaoping’s overall “economy first” reform and 
prioritization put the CDIC infrastructure and investment on 
the back-burner.  As a result, there was little currently 
existing high-tech civilian processes and factories that the 
CDIC could exploit.  Transferring civilian technology for 
defense purposes is a significant challenge for all 
developing nations, but China is appearing to have an 
especially difficult time.102  Chinese military R&D isn’t 
getting the significant and sustained funding and political 
interest, and the lack of resources and appropriate 
oversight continues to debilitate domestic efforts to 
develop and produce advanced weaponry.103 
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2. Joint Partnership 
Joint development of advanced weapons systems among 
allies is fast becoming the norm for modern weapons 
research, development, and production.  Even though the 
United States leads the world with its defense expenditures  
($439 billion defense budget for 2007), The U.S. Air Force 
is jointly developing the next generation F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter with the United Kingdom and other key allies.  With 
a development cost of US$35 billion, Great Britain is 
contributing 10 percent, Italy and Netherlands is each 
contributing 5 percent, while Denmark, Norway, Canada, 
Australia and Turkey are each contributing 1 to 2 
percent.104 
In addition to sharing the cost burden, joint ventures 
effectively reinforce the common principles and shared 
national interests of the developing nations.  To capture 
the synergistic effect of cost-sharing and common national 
interests, one expert asserts: 
No single vendor or country has the resources to invest 
individually to attain self-sufficiency in creating weapon 
platforms of the next generation.  The future well being of 
nations will depend on their integrating their armament 
industries effectively between countries with shared 
perceptions of their national interests by creating joint 
ventures.105 
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3. Foreign Procurement 
Given China’s established weakness and limitations in 
domestic production of advanced weaponry, China is actively 
pursuing and purchasing foreign military technology.  The 
recent sustained economic growth directly translates into 
larger defense budgets, and China appears to be taking full 
advantage of its growing wealth and the availability of 
foreign technology “to leap into current and next generation 
capabilities for the PLA.”106  In 1996, China supported 
seven fighter and attack aircraft programs most of which 
required foreign technical advice and guidance.  By 
comparison, the United States can barely afford three new 
fighter programs, and in 1997, China had the financial 
resources to purchase yet another, the SU-30 attack 
aircraft.107 
The officially reported Chinese defense budget was 
US$14.6 billion, over 40 percent of which (US$6 billion) was 
earmarked for defense procurement.108  At that level of 
funding, China could afford to purchase several dozen combat 
aircraft, five to ten surface warships, two to five 
submarines and sea mines.109  Additionally, a study by the 
Defense Science Board calculated that a developing nation 
could acquire a reasonably high capacity for high-tech/RMA-
                     
106 Richard Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization” in 
China’s Military Faces the Future James Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds. 
(American Enterprise Inst: Washington DC, 1999)  85. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Richard Bitzinger, “Just the Facts, Ma’am:  The Challenge of Analysing 
and Assessing Chinese Military Expenditures” The China Quarterly, no. 173 (Mar 
1, 2003), 164-175 http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed Aug 29, 2007). 
109 Gill, 221. 
 39
type warfare with an investment of only $20 billion over a 
10 year period, or just $2 billion per year.110 
G. CONCLUSION 
 The PLA modernization effort is critical to upgrading 
its military capability and securing China’s increasingly 
global national interests.  In 2007, Beijing increased its 
defense budget by 18% for modernization efforts.  This is a 
significant step for the PLA since it validates their 
concerns of diminishing funds and increasing military 
expectations.  Like every military it depends upon 
government funding for its very existence.  China’s booming 
economy is allowing China to expand discretionary 
expenditures such as military modernization, however, 
China’s economy still isn’t as efficient as it could be.   
The PLA modernization program depends upon significant and 
sustained defense budget expenditures to ensure multi-year 
programs and reforms aren’t cut or under-funded during 
economic recessions.  Arguably, the greatest “drag” on the 
Chinese economy is the inefficient banking sector which is 
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III. CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM 
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party opened China to the 
rest of the world by launching widespread economic reforms.  
This section will outline highlights of those reform 
measures, concentrating on banking reform and the 
concomitant shedding of the inefficient SOEs that stimulated 
so many of the reforms. 
A. ECONOMIC STABILITY FIRST 
After the Chinese Communist Party consolidated power, 
economic stability was one of their highest priorities.  The 
party leadership recognized that one of the significant 
factors leading to the downfall of the Chiang Kai-Shek and 
the Kuomintang government was their inability to control 
hyperinflation.  During the winter of 1948-49 much of China 
that remained under Nationalist rule “had been reduced to a 
barter economy.”111  The Communist party leadership 
recognized the urgent need to quickly resurrect the economy 
and aggressively attacked the systemic problems.  They 
created a new currency and nationalized the banks to try and 
spur economic recovery, since “nothing could buy the 
communists the support of the urban populace more rapidly 
than taming inflation and getting the economy going 
again.112 
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China’s centrally planned economy needed a convenient 
mechanism to finance the party leadership’s priorities.  The 
state budget played the dominant role in funneling national 
savings toward investments.  As a result, China’s banking 
system as a financial intermediary was far more limited than 
in the west.113  As an organization, “China's pre-1979 
banking system was characterized by its monolithic, 
centralized, and hierarchical structure. Since specialized 
banks were few, most of the functions and authority in the 
banking system were concentrated in the People's Bank of 
China.”114 
B. FIRST STAGES OF BANK REFORM 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms during the latter part 
of the 1970’s were the enabling action that allowed the 
Chinese economy to prosper.  His phrase “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” was a marked break from Socialism’s 
traditional ideology of state-owned means of production.  
While the existence of free-market enterprises and privately 
owned production facilities are inconsistent with socialist 
ideas, his reforms significantly raised the Chinese standard 
of living.  When Deng Xiaoping “came to power in 1978, per 
capita peasant income was 132 yuan or $66, and one quarter 
of China’s rural population had a per capita income of less 
than 50 yuan.  The urban population fared a little better 
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with an average of 383 yuan. 115  In 2006, per capita income 
had risen to 58,295 yuan or $7,700 U.S. Dollars.116 
During one of his many speeches, Deng Xiaoping uttered 
the famous phrase “No matter if it is a white cat or a black 
cat; as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat.”  His 
intent was to improve the economic condition of his country 
and he wasn’t averse to incorporating capitalist ideas to 
improve China’s economic footing.  This willingness to be 
flexible and open to new ideas isn’t the same as abandoning 
socialism or China’s significant history.  Instead, this 
realist approach is an explanation; a methodology to try and 
predict future economic policy based on the assumption that 
Chinese policy isn’t strictly beholden to Socialist doctrine 
for a centrally planned economy.   
Beginning in 1978, economic reforms addressed four 
major components:  decentralization of economic 
administration; partial adoption of free-market mechanisms; 
wider use of economic tools (such as taxes, credit, interest 
rates) instead of administrative edicts in economic 
management; and partial liberalization of private 
enterprises.117  To accomplish those reforms the party 
leadership decided to significantly increase the role of the 
banks in China’s growth.  Beijing’s leaders especially 
wanted the reformed banking system to “provide effective and 
flexible methods for countering inflationary pressures” 
which were expected to result from the fundamental changes 
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to China’s economic structure.118  Figure 3.1 and 3.2 
graphically portrays the relatively simple organizational 
structure of the Chinese banking system pre- and post 
reform. 
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Figure 3.2  The Banking System After Decentralization120 
 
 
Under post-reform guidance, the new state controlled 
banks (SCBs) – Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), the People’s Construction Bank of China (PBOC), the 
Bank of China (BOC) and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
were allowed to engage in a wider range of lending 
activities which strengthened the banks overall financial 
intermediary functions.121  However, the increased lending 
ability resulted in free-flowing loans to state-sanctioned 
programs and projects with high central-planning policy 
priority. 
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1. Problem of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
Nicholas Lardy succinctly defines the problem of bank 
lending to SOEs:  “The insatiable demand of state-owned 
enterprise for credit lies at the root of China’s 
macroeconomic instability in the reform period.”122 The 
often used phrase, “iron rice-bowl” refers to the cradle-to-
grave social support provided by SOEs to its workers.  The 
enterprises provided their employees with medical care, 
housing, subsidized heating, and generous pensions.123   
City Steel is just one example of the type of benefits 
provided by the SOE.  Plant managers would build subsidized 
housing for newly married workers and employ workers’ 
children, even though the company couldn’t afford the 
subsidized housing and the plant already had far too many 
workers.124  So instead of a profit-maximizing orientation, 
SOE executives had to also contend with heavy social 
obligations to care for workers, excess manpower, and 
outdated equipment. 
2. Reforms of SOEs 
Despite on-going reforms to privatize SOEs, they remain 
a significant component of the Chinese economy.  In 1994, 
China had more than 102,000 SOEs, which represent only 1 
percent of the total number of Chinese enterprises, but 
employed 75 percent of the urban industrial workforce and 
consumed 57 percent of new investment and 70 percent of all 
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bank loans.125  After more than a decade of reforms, 50 
percent of China’s SOEs reported losses, and it was 
estimated that a further 33 percent actually incurred losses 
despite reporting profits.126  In 2006, these inefficient 
legacies of the rigid, communist, centrally planned economy 
still account for 30 – 40% of the Chinese economy.127  These 
enterprises function very differently from private and 
publicly owned businesses since they don’t respond to market 
signals and/or Beijing’s policies to steer its markets.128  
As remnants of the “iron rice-bowl” of state supplied 
employment, health-care, pension the vast majority of urban 
peasant workers have come to depend upon state factories for 
their cradle-to-grave requirements.   
But the inherent inefficiencies of these factories are 
immediately obvious at the highest levels of the Communist 
party leadership, and presents the leadership with competing 
priorities:  on the one hand, the leadership understands the 
need to shed these weights and aggressively pursue economic 
growth, and on the other hand, there is the breakup of the 
social contract of the state providing for the worker’s 
needs.  The human face of the privatization effort is 
considerable.  Since 1997, over 60 million jobs were lost 
from the dismantling of SOEs.129   
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The break-up of SOEs need to continue, but that 
initiative has created another set of thorny problems that 
Beijing must attack, namely high personal savings and low 
consumer consumption.  The Chinese national savings rate is 
an astounding 50%.  One of the drivers of this incredible 
savings rate is the dismantling of SOEs that previously 
provided jobs, income, shelter, medical care, education, and 
retirement support.  As this social safety-net is dismantled 
it is fueling a powerful trend of precautionary savings to 
compensate for the Chinese way of life that has been 
fundamentally altered.   
Many experts agree that the legitimacy of the ruling 
Chinese Communist Party is directly tied to China’s 
sustained superior economic growth.  Economic ascendence, 
and the resulting domestic pride and international prestige 
that it engenders allows the communist party to avoid the 
inherent contradictions of communism and private property, 
socialism and free market enterprise.  The booming economy 
also serves as a domestic diversionary tactic by allowing 
the communist leaders to point to the very visible successes 
of its reform measures and forestall social unrest that 
usually accompanies massive unemployment. 
C. EXCHANGE RATE REVALUATION 
On 21 July 2005, after years of pressure from the 
United States and other ASEAN countries, the Chinese 
government announced that the country’s exchange rate would 
move to a managed floating exchange rate based on market 
supply and demand to an unspecified basket of currencies 
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(emphasis added).130  By not specifying which basket of 
currencies it will value the yuan against, Beijing is 
hedging its strategy to allow it to moderate an immediate 
strengthening of the yuan. With this reform, the yuan 
switched from an artificial peg of 8.21 yuan against to the 
U.S. dollar to a more market based valuation.  As of August 
2007, the yuan has appreciated to 7.54 yuan to the U.S. 
dollar.   
This revaluation has significant symbolic value for the 
United States.  It announces Chinese willingness to accede 
to global pressures for equitable trade, and represents 
Chinese acceptance of its responsibilities to help maintain 
stability of the global economy.  At the same time, the 
revaluation is not so large as to significantly damage the 
profitability of Chinese exports.131 
D. CHINESE HYPER-GROWTH DUE TO UNRESTRICTED BANK LENDING 
The March 17, 2007 China Daily reported that in order 
to contain and manage its explosive growth, The People’s 
Bank of China raised key lending and savings interest rates 
for the third time in 11 months in order to curb inflation.  
The article goes on to quote Glenn Maguire, chief Asia 
economist at Societe Generale SA in Hong Kong, who 
forecasted two more rounds of interest rate hikes for this 
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year alone.132  However, recent history shows that these 
monetary policy measures to restrict the money supply will 
prove fruitless since independent local branches of 
nationwide banks and largely autonomous regional banks 
continue to push loans to promote growth in their local 
regions.   
Hyper-growth in eight of China’s 31 regions have 
accounted for 72% of total Chinese GDP growth since 2000, 
despite containing only 40% of China’s total population.133  
Local leaders have very pressing and immediate concerns of 
job creation for their local constituents, and distant 
Beijing’s policies to moderate growth are not often 
enthusiastically received.  While China’s aggregate GDP 
growth rate may be 10% as often quoted, the dispersion 
across the vast nation is fueling provinces of haves and 
have-nots, with some regions experiencing near 20% growth 
while rural areas suffer stagnant growth.134  China’s big 
four banks collectively have over 75,000 branches, 
underscoring the autonomy of local banks to provide direct 
lending, and thereby reducing the efficacy of monetary 
policies to tighten the money supply.135  Any attempts to 
restrict lending via the money supply will have uneven 
effects across China, amidst already very uneven growth 
between the coastal areas and the rural interior regions.  
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Additionally, it could potentially take even stronger 
monetary tightening measures to accomplish a given policy 
objective in this decentralized and fragmented banking 
system than would be the case if those largely autonomous 
banks were tied more closely together. 
E. PROBLEM OF NON-PERFORMING LOANS (NPLS)  
The government not only fully owns the Big Four State 
Banks, but also directly or indirectly controls 95 percent 
of the assets of most of the other 75,000 local banks 
through shares held by local municipalities and SOEs that 
remain outside the banking sector.136  Because of this 
tremendous concentration of resources, the state commercial 
banks and the policy banks completely dominate the Chinese 
financial sector.  Figure 3.3 shows the high concentration 
of state bank loans as an overall percentage of the total 
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Figure 3.3 Share of State Bank Lending and Deposit to 
Total Lending and Deposit, 1997-2001137 (qtrly)         
Note:  1 = 100% 
 
 
In order to keep stoking the fires of the Chinese 
economy (fixed asset investments and export led growth), in 
August 1998 China shifted from a policy of “tightening to 
one of macroeconomic stimulus, through increased fiscal 
outlays” and increased lending by state banks.138  In a 
curious turn of circumstance, the tremendous growth in 
China’s GDP and the successful banking organizational 
reshuffle and reforms fueled the next tremendous challenge 
of non-performing bank loans.  Since the government in 
effect owns the entire financial system, controls the price 
of capital, and provides an implicit guarantee that bank 
losses will be funded by the state there is no “moral 
hazard.”139  As a result, both bank managers and borrowers 
have a tremendous incentive to take excessive risks on 
questionable business activities. 
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Additionally, the successful ongoing reforms to 
privatize or dismantle SOEs created significant unemployment 
and social pressures on senior Chinese officials.  Beijing’s 
gradualist approach to economic reforms meant that many 
loans issued during the late 1980s and through the 1990s 
were issued on a non-commercial basis.  Instead, banks 
issued credit to pay workers’ wages and to fund pension 
obligations.140  Obviously, the practice of securing credit 
to pay salaries and pensions negatively affected 
profitability and added more fuel to the NPL fire.  Near the 
height of the NPL problem in 1997, unofficial estimates put 
the NPL ratio as high as 65% of total bank lending.141 
1. Asset Management Corporations (AMCs) 
In 1999, The Ministry of Finance (MoF) established four 
AMCs to address the growing problem of NPLs.  Each AMC would 
align with one of the Big Four State Banks and assume the 
RMB 1.39 trillion book value of the bank’s NPLs in order to 
improve the overall credit-worthiness of the Big Four Banks.  
The MoF created Cinda (for China Construction Bank), China 
Orient (for the People’s Bank of China), Huarong (for the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of china), and Great Wall 
(for Agricultural Bank of China).   
To finance this transaction, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC) loaned cash to the AMCs and the AMCs issued 10-year 
bonds to the Big Four Banks equal to the original NPL 
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exposure.  The net effect was that the “credit risk was 
passed” directly back to the PBoC.142  Because the MoF owns 
all the aforementioned institutions, there was no net cost 
to the state.  The credit risk and financial exposure of the 
NPLs were shifted from the Big Four State Banks to the 
central PBoC through the AMCs which significantly 
strengthened the balance sheets of the banks. 
2. On-going Challenge of NPLs 
At the end of 2004, the Chinese government estimated 
that the NPL ratio for major commercial banks in China, 
including the Big Four state-owned banks amounted to RMB 1.7 
trillion (US$240.7billion) or 13.2%, down 4.6% over the 
year.  Bank of China independently reported an NPL ratio of 
4.55% as of October 2004, which is down from 5.16% at the 
end of September 2004, and 16.3% since the beginning of the 
year.  China Construction Bank reported an NPL ratio of 
3.74% at the end of September 2004, which is the lowest 
amount among the Big Four State banks.143   
At the end of 2004, the China Bank Regulatory 
Commission reported an overall NPL ratio of 13% for the 
state commercial banks and joint-stock banks, and a ratio of 
23% for rural credit cooperatives.144  As is often the case 
with officially reported Chinese statistics, private 
estimates of the NPL ratios are much higher.  Independent 
market estimates by credit rating agencies, international 
                     
142 Phillip Gilligan “China NPLs:  Trends and Future Issues” Available on-
line http://www.deacons.com.hk/eng/knowledge/knowledge_225.htm (Accessed Sep 15, 
2007). 
143 Gilligan, 4. 
144 Anderson, 84. 
 55
institutions and academic analysts generally agree the NPL 
ratio for commercial banks is 25% and 30% for smaller credit 
institutions.145 
Assuming a 25% NPL ratio means that Chinas currently 
has the worst banking system in all of Asia in 2005.  As a 
point of reference, Figure 3.4 shows the estimated NPL 
ratios for 10 other Asian nations and the estimated ratio 
for China is twice as high as its regional neighbors.   
Figure 3.4 Current NPL Ratios in Asia146 
 
 
Because bank officials approved loans according to 
central planning priorities which stressed rapid economic 
expansion and export-led GDP growth it isn’t overly 
surprising that many of the loans went bad.  Another 
compelling problem of the NPLs is that because of the heavy 
indebtedness of the SOE sector, firms often can only pay 
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nominal amounts of interest without any hope of ever paying 
off the full principal.  Therefore, one can easily (and 
safely) presume that the true “impaired asset” figure of the 
SOE loans in jeopardy is much higher than the actual NPLs 
with overdue interest payments.147  It is important to note 
that while the 25% NPL ratio is still very high and there is 
still much room for improvement, the ratio dropped from over 
60% in approximately 10 years. 
F. BANK LENDING AND OVERINVESTMENT STILL FUELING 
HYPERGROWTH 
Beijing’s tremendous GDP growth stems from the 
realization that globalization is an irreversible trend and 
the best way to deal with the inevitable dislocations of an 
interdependent globalized economy is to merge its policies 
with the international economic system.148  The reforms 
started by Deng Xiaoping started this merger with the 
globalized economies, but Beijing still has a plethora of 
options to reform its economic policies in order to try and 
sustain its economic growth.  China’s economy is in serious 
danger of overheating.   
In 2005, fixed asset investment hit 45% of Chinese GDP 
and should exceed 50% of GDP in 2006.149  China’s booming 
economy is driving this capital investment with 
modernization, urbanization and industrialization.  However 
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that staggering investment rate even surpasses Japan and 
South Korea’s investment ratios of 40% in their respective 
booming periods.150   
These capital investments and exports are the two 
sectors of China’s economy that now account for more than 
80% of total Chinese GDP and collectively, these two sectors 
raced ahead by nearly a 30% year-over-year rate in the 
second quarter of 2006.151  The scale of its capital 
investments is staggering and unlike anything the world has 
seen in recent memory.  “From 200 to 2005, Chinese fixed 
investment surged from about $400 billion to $1.1 trillion – 
a 680 billion increase that was nearly 70% larger than the 
U.S. investment delta of about $400 billion realized over 
the same period.”152 Stephen Roach, Chief Economist of 
Morgan Stanley summarizes this situation succinctly, stating 
“this is not a sustainable outcome for any economy.”153  The 
most effective mechanism for cooling down a racing economy 
is to contract the money supply through monetary policies.  
However, Beijing’s efforts are stymied since their 
decentralized banking system prevents the full effects of 
central monetary policies to fully disperse throughout the 
economy.  
                     
150 Stephen Roach, “China’s Great Contradiction’ Morgan Stanley, Jun 30, 
2006, http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2006/20060630-Fri.html 
(Accessed Jul 17, 2007). 
151 Stephen Roach, "China's Control Problem." Morgan Stanley, Jul 21, 2006, 
http://www.morganstanley.com/ (Accessed Jul 17,2007). 
152 Stephen Roach. "Scale and the Chinese Policy Challenge." Morgan Stanley, 
Jun 19, 2006, http://www.morganstanley.com/ (Accessed Jul 18,2007). 
153 Ibid. 
 58
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 59
IV.  BANKING REFORM TO SUSTAIN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Previous sections established the national strategic 
intent to modernize the PLA.  Also, Beijing has expressly 
stated their adoption of RMA and senior party and military 
leaders recognize the high-technology requirements of modern 
military forces.  To modernize and equip the PLA with the 
advanced arms and tactics necessary for an RMA continued 
banking reform is an essential step to secure the necessary 
funding. 
 This section will address the importance of banking 
reform as a methodology to grow the Chinese economy.  The 
beginning sections will outline the scope of the current 
defense budget and project how much of the central budget 
should be devoted to defense.  Later sections will 
specifically address components of banking reform such as 
improving corporate governance, and introducing foreign 
competition as essential catalysts for improving banking 
performance.  This section will close with capturing the 
scope of the bank recapitalization challenge, and reiterate 
how aggressive banking reforms will contribute to PLA 
modernization efforts.  
A. HOW MUCH MONEY IS NEEDED? 
 Figure 4.1154 shows the broad range of estimates of 
Chinese military expenditures.  Because of the opaqueness of 
official Chinese reporting, different assumptions must be 
made in order to try and fully capture total defense 
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spending.  For example, it is widely known that China’s 
“backward, bloated and inefficient military-industrial 
complex operates at a loss” and that official defense 
budgets do not include the costs of direct subsidies to 
Chinese defense industries or forced loans by state-owned 
banks to arms factories.155  It is also unclear how many 
PLA-owned businesses were actually sold off as required by 
the 1998 Divestiture Act (most PLA-run farms were exempted, 
for example), how many are still secretly owned through 
dummy partnerships, and how many divestiture orders were 
simply ignored.156  Finally, some type of purchasing power 
parity (PPP) multiplier must be used to gauge defense 
spending since Chinese “defense spending basket” costs much 
less than in the West.  Through low pay and poorer living 
standards the PLA saves money on personnel costs, while 
lower wages at defense industries artificially reduces the 
true cost of weapons procurement.157  These are just a few 
of the reasons Western estimates of Chinese defense spending 
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Figure 4.1  Western Estimates of Chinese Military 
Expenditures (official budget = 100)158 
 
 
Regardless of the particular path of PLA 
modernization,159 significant and sustained defense 
expenditures are needed.  Assuming even moderate GDP growth, 
the increased government revenues will have to be used to 
bail out state-owned banks, protect and rescue the 
environment, support the unemployed, and provide all the 
services of the 200 million or so rural-urban migrants.160 
These pressing societal demands will constrain growth in all 
other budget categories including defense. 
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It wouldn’t be unreasonable to argue that China (along 
with every military in the world) could use more funding.  
Also assuming there is no drastic change to China’s security 
environment to precipitate a dramatic increase in defense 
spending, what are the projected levels of defense spending 
that China will have to pay for?  Table 4.2 outlines a RAND 
projection of future Chinese military spending. 
 
Table 4.1 RAND Projections of Chinese Military Spending 
Through 2025161 
 
 Billions of 2001 Renminbi 
 2003 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Maximum Projection 314.5 702.7 1001.7 1307.4 1633.3 
Mid-Range Projection 256.6 416.6 531.7 646.9 750.0 
      
 Percentage of GDP 
Maximum Projection 2.8 4.0 4.3 4.6 5.0 
Mid-Range Projection 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Ratio between maximum 
and mid-range 
1.23 1.73 1.88 2.02 2.18 
 
 
These projected expenditures assume the Chinese 
government will choose to also substantially increase 
expenditures on education, health, pensions and an improved 
social safety net.  They also assume that to maintain their 
global credit-worthiness, China will be compelled to convert 
currently unrecognized liabilities into government debt and 
service those debts with market interest rates.  Even with 
all these competing demands, military expenditures that 
require approximately 2 percent of GDP are acceptable.162  
An upper limit of 5 percent of GDP devoted to defense 
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162 Scobell and Wortzel, 128. 
 63
expenditures would create serious friction with the 
increasing societal demands on government spending. 
1. Defense Expenditures Possibly “Crowded Out” By 
Societal Spending 
PLA modernization is better served by significant and 
sustained defense budget spending versus inconsistent, 
reactionary funding based on a perceived threat, or lack 
thereof.  High levels of funding, year-over-year signifies 
national strategic intent, and the commitment of scarce 
national resources to fulfilling that intent.  Although the 
probability of economic collapse is slim, consistent defense 
spending could be threatened by economic stagnation. During 
periods of slow or negative growth, societal demands for 
increased spending on pensions, health care and other 
desperately needed social programs would increase along with 
the rise in unemployment and other deleterious effects of 
prolonged economic stagnation.  Fear of internal unrest 
could result in a ferocious crackdown (as in the 1989 
Tiananmen Square protests), or a higher prioritization of 
domestic spending to ease those social tensions which would 
crowd out defense spending on PLA modernization. 
B. IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
When asked what are the key issues and challenges 
facing banks, Chairman of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission Liu Minkang stated, “Improving corporate 
governance is the key challenge facing us in relation to the 
banks and a critical issue is establishing the boundary 
between the board of directors and the executive committee.  
 64
We are just at the beginning and we need more time to 
collect more accurate data.”163 
Effective corporate governance and reducing state 
influence in lending decisions is a critical step to 
improving banking efficiency.  Sound corporate governance 
procedures are “the first line of defense in managing bank 
risk” since it ensures that authorized, accountable people 
make rational, transparent decisions and establishes checks 
and balances to minimize conflict of interest, collusion and 
fraud.164 
Many Chinese banks lack even the most basic components 
of good governance.  While poor lending decisions to non-
performing SOEs represent one category of inefficient 
banking processes, an entirely different category of poor 
banking practices is fraudulent lending.  At one unspecified 
bank, fraud was involved in about 33 percent of new 
nonperforming mortgages (as opposed to less than 1 percent 
in most developed countries).  Many loans had fictitious 
addresses, with no property as collateral, while some 
mortgage holders received money for properties they didn’t 
own.165  In another highly publicized case, a Chinese court 
convicted Cheng Kejie, former vice chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s 
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parliament, to death for authorizing fraudulent loans and 
amassing $US 5 million in bribes and kickbacks.166 
Despite tough measures, current reforms to improve 
corporate governance are beset with political influence, and 
potential for conflicts of interest.  As previously 
mentioned, China’s AMCs are the specific reform vehicles 
through which China’s banks would recapitalize, improve 
solvency, and showcase China’s serious efforts to embrace 
WTO guidelines and prepare for foreign competition.  Yet the 
AMCs remain as state-owned, non-banking financial 
institutions that must answer to a multitude of political 
agencies while attempting to act and conduct business as 
commercial entities.  Members from the China Banking and 
Regulatory Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission sit on the Supervisory 
Board of the AMCs, all “with separate agendas.”167  Perhaps 
the most controversial matter regarding corporate governance 
at the AMCs is the fact that the President of the four 
state-owned central banks also serve as the Party Secretary 
– a key position – at each of the four corresponding 
AMCs.168 
While Beijing is certainly attacking the problem of 
poor governance, the adopted measures focus on the largest 
banks, and specifically, those banks scheduled for the early 
rounds of going public through initial public offerings 
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(IPOs).  Gaining tighter control of a handful of very large, 
high profile banks is much simpler than transforming the 
corporate governance in the 120 or so smaller regional and 
local banks and the nearly 30,000 credit co-ops which 
command 40 to 50 percent of total banking assets in 
China.169  These smaller institutions are especially prone 
to corrupt lending practices but harder to regulate and 
audit since they are so numerous and geographically 
dispersed. 
C. FOREIGN COMPETITION FOR BANKS 
China’s bank reform strategy includes listing Chinese 
banks on foreign stock exchanges to impose market pressures 
and discipline on managers, directors and board members.  
The intent was to “improve the accuracy and transparency of 
their reporting to international standards and to subject 
bank performance to market appraisals of efficiency and 
profitability.”170  The overall intent was to thrust Chinese 
banks onto the world stage and push management toward 
emphasizing rates of return on assets and increasing 
profitability.   
Unfortunately, the evidence does not show that the 
initial rounds of Chinese bank IPOs provided strong stimulus 
for other banks to adopt strong commercial lending 
practices.  An International Monetary Fund working paper 
concluded, “In the 1997-2004 data, it is difficult to find 
solid empirical evidence of a strong shift to commercial 
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orientation by [state-controlled banks].  The pricing of 
credit risk remains rather undifferentiated, and bank 
lending continues to be driven by availability of funds and 
does not appear to take enterprise profitability into 
account when making lending decisions – the four large State 
Controlled Banks continue to lose market share in provinces 
with more profitable enterprises.171  Allowing greater 
foreign ownership of banks would introduce new capital into 
the industry and remove moral hazards by taking the state 
central planners completely out of credit decisions. 
D. COST OF BANK RECAPITALIZATION 
The total cost of bank restructuring may eventually 
approach 30 percent of GDP.172  Losses of this magnitude are 
not overly surprising since NPLs are believed to have 
accounted for as much as 40 to 50 percent of loans 
outstanding at their peak in the 1990s.173  Banking reform, 
as a distinct subcomponent of all economic reforms, are 
aimed specifically at improving the efficiency of capital 
resource allocation within the economy.  It is important to 
note that a financial shock such as a recession or economic 
stagnation wasn’t the catalyst for change; rather the 
motivating factor was decreasing economic efficiency. 
The central government initiated several measures to 
recapitalize the banks including bond issuance, foreign 
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exchange injections, and of course, creating the AMCs.  
While the efficacy of those recapitalization measures are 
still debated, another daunting issue is the quality of the 
loans granted since those measures took place.  Since many 
of the loans were just recently granted, and given the poor 
track record of Chinese abilities to accurately price credit 
risk, another significant round of cash infusion may be 
necessary to bail out the new loans.  In May 2006, the 
accounting firm of Ernst and Young released a report stating 
that China’s NPLs totaled $911 billion (40 percent of 
China’s GDP), a figure far surpassing official estimates of 
$164 billion.174  Additionally, in the first four months of 
2006, Chinese banks lent 60 percent of the credit they 
issued for all of 2005.  That furious pace of lending “is 
bound to give rise to future bad loans.”175 
E. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
Although Chinese authorities have made significant 
progress on their financial and banking system reforms, much 
still needs to be done.  China is fortunate in that there 
are several extenuating circumstances that still make its 
inefficient banking sector still viable.  China’s continued 
high rate of GDP growth and high rate of savings have 
channeled funds into the banking system while a $20 – 30 
billion annual trade surplus combined with foreign direct 
investment at about $40 billion per year have resulted in 
the accumulation of foreign exchanges reserves in excess of 
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$200 billion.176  This cash reserve combined with China’s 
manageable debt burden provides some reassurance that China 
is not facing an imminent financial crisis. 
Since the big four banks are fully government owned and 
the central government, directly or indirectly, controls 95 
percent of the assets of most other banks through shares, 
Beijing simply cannot allow the banking sector to fail.  At 
the end of 2005, lending from the four state banks was 
roughly 70 percent of GDP, while total bank lending was 
about 113 percent of GDP, and the bank deposit base was just 
under 158 percent of GDP.177  The banks strategic importance 
as lenders to the state firms which employ millions 
guarantees that politics and lending will be symbiotically 
intertwined.  Fortunately, this inter-dependency ensures 
that continued banking reform should continue to figure 
prominently on the national political agenda. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
China must modernize its weaponry in order for the PLA 
to be a credible military force and enable China to continue 
its rise as a regional and global power.  PLA modernization 
expenditures will have to compete with other societal reform 
programs for the windfall from an expanding economy.  
Arguably, the most important on-going reform involves the 
banking sector in order to allow Beijing to better mobilize 
and utilize its capital resources. 
The central government has explicitly stated the need 
to underwrite an RMA and modernize the PLA.  Continued 
banking reform is an essential component to grow the Chinese 
economy and secure the significant and sustained defense 
spending that is critical to the PLA modernization effort.  
The ultimate success of banking reforms depends on 
authorities creating strong incentives for banks to base 
lending decisions on established commercial principles.  
Also, there needs to be a standard set of incentives for 
bank managers to responsibly discharge their fiduciary 
responsibilities, and regulations and procedures to punish, 
or hold accountable, those managers that don’t maintain 
established standards.  These measures are important for the 
overall growth of the economy and for the overall 
modernization of the PLA. 
The PLA has witnessed significant developments since 
its genesis as the Revolutionary Red Army.  It remains a 
powerful state institution and the de facto guarantor of 
power in China.  Its modernization efforts paralleled the 
doctrinal shifts as Beijing’s leaders scanned their 
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environment and prepared their nation to confront their 
greatest perceived threats.  From “People’s War” to 
“People’s War Under Modern Conditions” to the Revolution in 
Military Affairs, the PLA has adapted to the various 
political pressures in order to redefine itself. 
Current world trends and events are placing 
contemporary pressures onto PLA modernization efforts.  The 
combination of the RMA, the end of the Cold War, the overall 
trend toward globalization, the exorbitant cost of advanced 
weapons, and the rapid pace of technological innovation has 
made it virtually impossible for countries to independently 
develop advanced weaponry.  Globally, defense industries are 
shrinking and consolidating.  States that once had the 
capability to develop and produce their own weapons are 
increasingly pursuing joint development to help offset the 
enormous costs of modern advanced weapon systems.178 
As China becomes older, wealthier, and more urbanized 
CCP leaders will come under increasing pressure to provide 
more social services to its citizens.  Defense expenditures 
and PLA modernization efforts will have to compete with 
additional government spending on pensions, health care, 
public infrastructure and the environment.  Without a 
tangible, external threat or enemy to unify the common 
Chinese citizen to support greater defense spending, social 
tensions will continue to plague CCP leaders.  In 1993, 
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there were 8,700 mass protests and demonstrations in.  By 
2005, that number increased to 83,000.179 
The worlds leading commercial banks use market 
principles to evaluate and manage the myriad risks they face 
in their business operations.  Their credit decisions are 
based on objective evaluation and independent of political 
considerations and personal connections.  If the Chinese 
government wishes to keep majority ownership during the 
financial system’s continued development and evolution to 
free-market principles, then Beijing’s expectation that the 
state banks “will behave like commercial banks is likely to 
be disappointed.”180  However, if banking reforms are 
successful and China can steadily grow its economy through 
the more efficient mobilization and utilization of its 
capital resources, then defense expenditures of two to five 
percent of GDP are sustainable.  Senior PLA leaders will 
still have to prioritize their modernization efforts to 
ensure they get the biggest “bang for their buck” but a 
steadily growing economy will provide predictability for 
expensive multi-year weapons development and procurement 
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